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Abstract Chile has been both a pioneer and the most radical follower of the idea of converting pension sa-
vings into contributions to privately-managed capital funds. Two recent portions of reforms under 
President Bachelet extended the social safety net as well as re-introduced publicly-administered 
programs on behalf of retirees.
 Does such direction, in the country with the longest lasting evidence of  privatized fully-funded 
pensions mean a fall  of the arrangement? The article attempts a political-economic argumentation 
in aim to form the answer.
 The premise is that risk sharing constitutes a crucial issue in insurance industry where old-age se-
curity is largely placed. In social security segment the risk of default on liabilities is backed by taxing 
capacity of the state; in fully-funded-pensions plans normally this is individual contributor who 
faces the portfolio risk. Therefore change in risk sharing between the contributors to the funds, 
pension management companies and the state is fundamental for evaluation of the reforms. The 
review of Chilean reforms reveals an institutional arrangement which is fundamental to risk sha-
ring, namely the relation between contribution and benefit, left intact. This finding supports the 
conclusion that bringing recently the state back into retirement system can not be conceived as any 
systemic revolution.
1 Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Faculty of Management and Social Communication, e-mail: anna.zabkowicz@uj.edu.pl.
MANDATORY PENSION FUNDS IN CHILE: DECLINE OF THE 
ARRANGEMENT?
Financial Internet Quarterly „e-Finanse” 2017, vol.13/ nr 4, s. 149-155
DOI: 10.1515/fiqf-2016-0043
JEL classification: P16, B52
Keywords: the political economy of pension reforms -  funded pensions - risk sharing
Received: 10.06.2017 Accepted: 20.12.2017
www.e-finanse.com
University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszów150
„e-Finanse” 2017, vol. 13 / nr 4Anna Ząbkowicz 
Mandatory pension funds in Chile: decline of the arrangement?
The article is an effect of the project –„Financialization New Trends and Directions of Development”- international conference, conducted by the University of 
Information Technology and Management in Rzeszów with Narodowy Bank Polski under the scope of economic education programme
Introduction
Funded pensions are secured through accumulation 
of contributions by or on behalf of fund’s affiliates and 
through investing accumulated funds in financial assets 
(Barr & Diamond, 2010). Since funding is normally 
managed by private companies this institutional 
arrangement allows for advancements in privatization 
of the pension industry. Actually, these phenomena 
are an outcome of fundamental reforms carried on in 
numerous emerging market economies of Latin America 
as well as of Central and Eastern Europe at the turn of 
20th and 21st centuries. In developed market economies 
the reforms promote voluntary funded pension plans. 
In some emerging market economies this institutional 
arrangement has been developed “green field” and, 
additionally, mandatory pension funding was introduced, 
not without persuasion of the World Bank (Sarfati & 
Ghellab, 2012). 
Chile has been both a pioneer and the most radical 
follower of the idea of converting pension savings into 
contributions to privately-managed capital funds. The 
funds were created in 1981 on the mandatory-insurance 
basis. Recently, more than 80 per cent of pension savings in 
Chile is invested under the rules governing this retirement 
system and 98 per cent of the insured are in the private 
pension system. This is a much more tilted reliance on 
mandatory private-managed savings than in the average 
OECD country which is 22,7 percent (Garcia-Huitron & van 
Leuvenstejn, 2015, p.197). Nowhere was the change so 
embracing. The early 21st century saw retreat from the 
pension funds created on mandatory basis worldwide. 
Also in Chile the 2008 crisis echoed with a prolonged re-
reform of the pension system. Reforms of 2008 and 2015 
under the socialist President Michelle Bachelet extend 
the social safety net as well as re-introduce publicly-
administered programmes. This change again seems to 
be internationally meaningful, also for Poland being one 
of the follower-countries1. 
The article poses the question whether a drive in new 
direction in the country of vast evidence on mandatory, 
funded, defined-contribution pensions means a decline 
of the arrangement? How to evaluate the weight of the 
change and, consequently, what is prognosis for bringing 
the state back in?
1 This is a reference both to demise of pension funds on mandatory 
basis (so called OFEs) in Poland and to Polish state’s role in recent pen-
sion plans based on automatic enrollment (the PPKs).
The explanation given here is not technocratic but of 
political-economic nature. It is based on the proposition 
that risk sharing constitutes a crucial issue in insurance 
industry where old-age security systems are largely 
placed. As long as it is maintained that both provision and 
“safe” level of old-age income are their goal, the state 
remains one of the parties in the scheme. As far as capital 
funded pension plans are considered, private pension 
management companies make another party. Since such 
plans are at the core of the pension system under the 
analysis, thus change in risk sharing between contributors 
to the funds, fund-management firms and the state is 
fundamental for evaluation of the system’s reforms. To 
be explicit, the question of portfolio risk or risk of failed 
investment is taken here under consideration.
The reforms and their evaluation
Apparently, universal old-age insurance is a very 
special branch of finance as far as its original social mission 
concerned. Its traditional core idea was social security 
which is provided by an income (pension) to be paid to 
a person when in the retirement age. In other words, 
income high enough to protect from poverty has been at 
heart of the mission. In the course of time the state took 
ultimate responsibility for pension benefits as well as for 
administration of the system which worked on the pay-as-
you go basis (PAYG) in most of the countries concerned.
In 1981, Chile was the first country to switch from 
a public PAYG pension system to individual accounts and 
funded pensions, and  to invite private companies into 
the pension industry. Under the 1981 reform Chilean 
state transferred management of new pension accounts 
from public agency toward private companies and, 
simultaneously, made contributions to these accounts 
mandatory, thus making fund-managing companies (the 
AFPs after Adminstradoras de fondos de pensiones) 
legally privileged vis a vis other financial firms competing 
for voluntary savings. Another structural change in 1981 
referred to the relation between individual contribution 
and pension benefit. The latter needs a wider elaboration 
to show what difference a different contribution-
benefit formula actually makes from economic-political 
perspective2.
In operational language of pension reforms a 
2 This is political-economic approach which must not be confused 
with risk management and risk-based supervision for pensions in the 
field of finance.
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formula for calculating pensions is named a “Defined 
Benefit” either a “Defined Contribution”. Under Defined 
Benefit (DB) formula, basically, public insurers were 
believed to afford benefits adequate to social minimum, 
mostly due to financing on PAYG basis, since this system of 
financing allowed for income redistribution. According to 
this formula, benefit may be based on the worker’s final 
wage and length of service, however, it does not depend 
on the amount of assets accumulated in the person’s 
name; instead, funds are adjusted to meet obligations; 
the risk of varying rates of return to pension assets finally 
falls on the sponsor. In traditional system the public 
management agency was backed by the state budget who 
was the sponsor. The paradigmatic reform changed the 
basic relation between contribution and benefit in the 
system as a whole. Under so called Defined Contribution 
(DC) formula the benefit is determined by the  amount 
of capital paid in toward a person’s pension. A pure DC 
plan adjusts obligations to match available funds; thus 
this is individual contributor who faces the portfolio risk 
(Barr & Diamond, 2008a). In brief, along with changing DB 
formula to DC formula the risk of old-age poverty is shifted 
from managing agent to contributor, with extremely 
low retirement benefit eventually being supplied up to 
minimal level from tax revenues. 
We claim that the consequent change in risk sharing 
among the contributors to the funds, management 
companies and the state is fundamental for how the 
reform is evaluated by the parties engaged. Under DB 
formula value of benefit, as calculated in accordance 
with the state-imposed rules, is actually guaranteed by 
the state. To put it differently, the state runs the risk that 
inflows to the system do not balance the outflows which 
are due to benefits.  Under DC formula the parameters 
of contribution are precise and contributed savings are 
transparently registered on individual member accounts 
to be invested in securities markets; the size of benefit 
depends on returns on capital, and therefore is uncertain. 
The risk of failed investment can be shared between 
contributors, pension management companies and the 
state (e.g. to the amount of the state-acknowledged 
minimal pension). Thus, whether the old-age insurance is 
governed by DB formula either by DC formula seems to be 
the crux of the win-loss matter and thus becomes a major 
issue of institutional political economy of the pension 
systems. 
The shift from DB formula to DC formula constituted 
another foundation of the 1981 reform, besides 
capitalization of pension funds and their privatization. 
In effect, the Chilean retirement system between 
1981 and 2008 was comprised of two pillars, the 
privately-administered second pillar and the first pillar, 
administered by the state. The first pillar contained the 
closing PAYG system and the tax-financed military-force 
and police-force schemes as well as retirement income 
safety net, and it was practically non-contributory. The 
second pillar was based on mandatory contributions 
to individual accounts managed by the private licensed 
companies (AFPs) under Defined Contribution formula 
and, as already said, it absorbed more than 80 per cent of 
pension savings in Chile.
The performance of the system was rather alarming. 
Suffice it to say, that benefits paid out to a bulk of pensioners 
were inadequate to national social minimum (Mesa-Lago 
& Bertranou, 2016, p.7-8). In 2007, that is in the eve of the 
re-reform, the minimum pension averaged 62 per cent of 
the minimum wage, and projections suggested that 35 per 
cent of men and 60 per cent of women would eventually 
receive it. Moreover, so called rates of replacement, which 
is an average pension as related to the average salary 
during the insured active life, were dramatically low. Even 
after the first wave of re-reform, they remained close or 
below the internationally-acknowledged minimum of 45 
per cent. Chile’s case dramatically exposes costs of the 
fully-funded DC formula system design in terms of social 
security which is, however, a topic for another article (see 
Mesa-Lago & Bertranou, 2016).
Chile’s pension reforms of 2008 and 2015 open space 
for renewed role of the state. Having in mind that by some 
the AFP-system is regarded to be a liberal project, a novel 
in the shape of increasing state aid may seem paradoxical. 
From another angle, for those, who believe the state to 
be an arbiter between private business and citizenry, the 
scope of state assistance may be still highly disappointing. 
The re-reforming pensions in 2008 transformed modest 
social assistance in the non-contributory pillar into 
increased tax-financed coverage of the poorest (see table 
1). 
As far as another, more recent reform considered, 
the 2015 report by Presidential Advisory Pension 
Commission revealed its members divided, basically, 
between two global proposals. “Proposal A” recommends 
building on the 2008 reform by expanding the non-
contributory tax-financed system and improving the 
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fully-funded component (Barr & Diamond, 2016, p.7). 
In general, it goes along with the view expressed in the 
IMF’s official statement, having been published just in the 
eve of approving one of the specific reform proposals in 
the Chilean Congress in early November 2016. According 
to this stance, “Chile’s pension system is rooted in sound 
principles “ and  “[t]he pension reform should preserve 
the current system”, however strengthening its delivery 
since “shortcomings are becoming evident” (IMF, 2016).  
“Proposal B” reduces the size of individual savings 
component and diverts about half of total contributions 
that currently go to mandatory pension funds into a new 
partially-funded element, organized through citizen social 
security accounts. Thus, it addresses the widespread 
hostility towards the AFP system by reducing its scale, and 
is a partial political response to near-universal support 
for the Solidarity Pension System (Barr & Diamond, 2016, 
p.7). Just for being politicized, however, it is criticized 
by international experts. As a matter of fact, option “B” 
proposes increasing the scope of the solidarity benefits 
up to 80% of population, which means increased state 
contributions from general tax revenues and expansion 
of the first pillar, leaving however the second pillar at the 
core of the system. 
Both reform proposals are by no means revolutionary. 
This observation goes with Barr’s and Diamond’s opinion: 
“Thus the specific proposals show a direction of travel, 
but more work is needed on many of the details; and 
there is no agreement about the need, or lack of need, 
for basic structural change.” (Barr & Diamond, 2016, p. 8).
Rather, they can be considered as an attempt to 
support the mandatory funded-pensions longevity 
thanks to developing the state’s safety net composed 
of solidarity benefits and/or social insurance3. How can 
this claim be defended? The ultimate argument is the 
pattern of risk sharing between contributors to the funds, 
fund-management companies and the state. The Chile’s 
pension system was grounded on two major institutional 
arrangements, namely on mandatory contributions to 
the AFP-managed funds and on DC formula. All referred 
attempts to re-reform do not question the AFP component 
at the core of the system. Such direction of travel does 
not mean a gradual demise of mandatory pension funds 
in Chile, no matter which of the two recommended 
packages is going to win majority in the Government and 
in the Congress. As far as contribution-benefit formula 
concerned, the  assessment of the pension system in 
2015, though obviously fair in enumerating the problems, 
hardly touched the issue. While attitudes towards 
contributory pillar managed by private companies are 
rather clear-cut in Proposal A and Proposal B, any change 
in benefit-contribution relation remains out of question. 
To be precise, the shift back from DC- to DB-formula 
was recommended solely in the package which did not 
win support of the Commission since it received only 
one vote (“Proposal C”)4. According to this proposal all 
the deposits and savings were to be transferred into the 
purely PAYG system, which implies abolition of privately 
3 This view corresponds with panorama of social change under de-
mocracy in Chile as evaluated by an insider and a sociologist, Manuel 
Antonio Garreton in his book on improved neo-liberalism and moderate 
progress (Garreton, 2012). In the period this article refers to the fourth 
Concertación government (2006-2010) led by socialist Michelle Bache-
let initiated major reforms to the social security and pension systems. 
When in 2009 the political right won the presidency in an electoral pro-
cess for the first time since 1958 with its candidate Sebastián Piñera, the 
new government largely maintained the generally business-friendly po-
licies of the Concertación, and also continued social policies promoted 
by Bachelet (BTI, 2016).
4 The only vote came from an expert from Poland, Professor Leoka-
dia Oręziak (see Oręziak, 2016).
Table 1: Pension benefits under 2008 reform
Pillar Non-contributory Contributory (only fully funded capital accounts)
Administration Social Security Administration
Pension management com-
panies (AFPs) and insurance 
companies
Financing General tax revenues Workers contributions accor-ding to taxable wage
Benefits
Poorest 60%, no contributions 
required Basic pension benefit -
Poorest 60%, some contributions 
required
Supplementary or additional 
pension benefit "self-financed pension benefit"
Fully contributory - "self-financed pension benefit"
Source: based on Bertranou (2016, p. 14), annex 2
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managed pension funds. It would have been a recurrence 
of DB formula system (Barr & Diamond, 2016, pp.7-8). 
Although the Commission themselves, as quoted by Barr 
and Diamond (2016, p.7), recognize that such radical 
change “seeks to respond to the views expressed during 
the public participation process”, apparently this option 
has no chance to become real. 
Thus, bringing the state back into Chilean pension 
system does not mean any fundamental change in risk 
sharing on behalf of contributors. The paradigmatic 
reform of 1981 abolished the employer’s contribution and 
shifted responsibility to workers who see their taxable 
income diminished due to mandatory pension savings, 
deposited in funds in order to be capitalized, and due to 
commissions and premiums paid to managing companies 
and insurance companies. They face the portfolio risk 
revealed by fluctuations of value of capital accumulated 
in individual accounts, like those up to 64.4 per cent of 
GDP in 2007, and down to 52.8 per cent of GDP in 2008 
due to the international financial crisis. The system gives 
them no chance to opt out in the face of steady decline of 
the annual real rate of return (from 20.6 per cent to 8.8. 
per cent since the inception of the system5). Rebuilding of 
social security solidarity mechanism included in Proposal 
B could have brought some relief to the low-income 
workers. Thanks to solidarity benefits they, possibly, would 
not be subject to excessive risk neither to complicated 
decision making, regarding portfolio investment options, 
choice of fund administrators, etc., to such extent as 
under the current system. Only those with income 
above certain level would contribute to the fully-funded 
individual saving accounts plan and take the full risk. In 
principle, however, with employers as non-participants 
to the schemes and with managing companies rewarded 
without any direct link to their services (see Kritzer, 2008; 
Knowledge@Wharton, 2009), those who suffer losses are 
still contributor-employees.
This grossly unfair position is acutely realized by 
Chilean people, and nationwide protests demanding 
reforms of the country’s pension system are not the only 
demonstration of this state of mind. According to Social 
Security Administration data, in 2007 about 40 per cent of 
affiliates with mandatory accounts were non-contributors 
and were not paying any administrative fees; in 2004 about 
half of retirees under the system of individual accounts 
retired before the normal retirement age (Kritzer, 2008, 
5 These data like the previous ones were retrieved from Mesa-Lago 
and Bertranou (2016), p.12.
p.78, 73). These outcomes should be partly associated 
with deficiencies of labor market. Namely, the Chileans 
do not contribute regularly to their retirement accounts 
possibly because getting work is too precarious for many 
and too many work outside the formal sector. However, 
these outcomes can be seen also as fund-affiliates’ 
massive boycott on the AFP-system either by evading it or 
by leaving it as soon as possible.
Experts, on contrary, when referring to the 
risk exposure demonstrate calmness of mind. Their 
technocratic reasoning can be skimmed as follows. In 
general, the system by transferring responsibility to an 
individual provides multiple economic advantages and 
diminishes political responsibility of the state to use funds 
that come from active workers to underwrite retirees. 
According to the IMF, “[o]ver the last 30 years, the fully 
funded DC formula system has raised national savings, 
aided the development of capital markets, and reduced 
fiscal risks.”(IMF, 2016). Individual risk exposure itself got 
limited due to introduced arrangements. Firstly, affiliates 
can choose among different income funds, with young 
persons, in principle, investing in variable income funds 
with relatively high risk, and with the older ones choosing 
funds with lower profitability and less exposed to possible 
losses. Nevertheless, since no sort of investment is risk-
free, in the face of losses “[t]he only thing left (...) is to 
wait until the recessionary economic cycle is over...” 
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2009, p. 4). Interestingly enough, 
this argument was delivered by Professor Fernando Bravo 
who was a member of Presidential Commission in 2008 
and a head of Presidential Commission in 2014/2015. 
Secondly, managing companies are obliged to meet a 
minimum level of return for each of the mentioned funds. 
In the event any of them fails to meet the guarantee 
obligation it must transfer the difference between actual 
return and the minimum level from its own reserve fund6. 
Moreover, parametric and institutional changes that 
would constitute challenges to AFPs are recommended, 
like setting maximum allowable losses for abnormal 
investment periods, relating charges and commissions 
to the real performance of administrators, along with 
monitoring shared between fund management staff, fund 
contributors and the government (Knowledge@Wharton, 
6 The minimum-level-of return requirement is rather a soft con-
straint for two reasons. The punishment is to happen only if a pension 
Fund’s return is below the minimum for three consecutive years which 
makes it easy to manipulate. Next, the bench-mark for AFPs is the weigh-
ted average return of all funds, so it suffice to follow the biggest AFPs in 
their investment choices in aim to remain close to the average and, thus, 
to remain safe. See Hyde (2014), pp.16-17.
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2009). However, one can doubt in the effectiveness of 
such risk-limiting pension engineering if one considers 
ignorance and confusion of the fund-affiliates on the one 
hand and the pension-funds managers’ insider knowledge 
and economic power on the other hand. 
The 1981 reform  initiated a departure to principles 
definitely different than counter-poverty and counter-
exclusion functions. The reforms under President Bachelet 
in some respects seem to recur to the solidarity mission of 
the old-age insurance in  the sense that contributors can 
have losses of assets, like those during the 2008+ financial 
turbulence, cushioned by a basic pension that sets a social 
floor. Undoubtedly, the basic and supplementary pension 
benefits as well as the idea of social-insurance benefit 
constitute a real progress in terms of social security. 
Increased tax-financed coverage, however, is addressed 
to the poorest. From the point of view of the major-risk-
bearing middle-income group of affiliates to the funds this 
change brings only little relief in their oppressive situation.
Conclusion
The evidence from Chile provides a series of lessons. 
This is a “laboratory” case of paradigmatic reforming old-
age insurance industry by designing fully-funded pensions 
and by inviting private companies to do business. Another 
founding principle is an utterly different formula of 
calculating pensions which determines risk sharing in the 
industry. The first founding principle, however, seems to 
be at the forefront, with recent retreat from mandatory 
funding winning considerably much scholar consideration 
and inducing questions about eventual fall of the 
arrangement. This article tries to stress the meaning of 
the second one. Chilean case is an example that change 
in formula of calculating pensions is easily overlooked 
in the debate and, even more, this issue happens to be 
marginalized by the reformers.
Recent pension reforms in Chile reinforce the role 
of the state and, eventually, diminish the weight of the 
pensions paid out due to mandatory funding managed 
by private companies, like bringing social insurance back 
in would do. The Presidential Commission’s proposals 
drive the pension system toward some form of increased 
state’s assistance and intervention. With respect to this 
direction, and taking the first founding principle only, 
it could be assumed that we see the decline of the 
arrangement. Nevertheless, the current reform is going to 
become no counter-revolution in respect of the formula 
of calculating pensions7. Thus, it should be regarded 
rather as mere correction. The Chilean case shows how 
effective are barriers against putting the relation between 
contribution and benefit under debate, in spite of the 
evident popular support for the previous system. In sum, 
Chilean reforms seem to leave the foundations of the 
system intact. Bringing the state back in must be seen 
rather as an attempt to support the  longevity of the fully 
funded Defined Contribution formula system thanks to 
solidarity benefits and/or social insurance, because the 
latter subsidize total retirement benefits and improve the 
distressing rates of replacement.
7 To put it straight, as far as now Chile is not going to follow suit of 
Peru or Argentina. In Argentina a radical return to the previous Defined 
Benefit formula materialized, the private component was eliminated 
and private savings were transferred toward the social security admini-
stration (Hujo & Rulli, 2014, p.1).
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